°¡»óÀû±¹ÀÇ 70%¿¡ ÇØ´çÇÏ´Â ÇرºÀü·ÂÀ» °Ç¼³ÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù´Â ÁÖÀåÀÇ ¿øÁ¶´Â ±¸ÀϺ»ÇرºÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
ÀÌ 100³â Àü ±¸ÀϺ»ÇرºÀÇ "70% ÁÖÀÇ"°¡ À̸® Àú¸® µ¹°í µ¹¾Æ Çѱ¹ÇرºÀ¸·Î ¿Í¼ ¶Ç "70% ÁÖÀÇ"°¡ µÈ °ÍÀÎÁö, ¾Æ´Ï¸é "70% ÁÖÀÇ"´Â Çѱ¹ÇرºÀº ÀüÇô »ý°¢ÇÏÁö ¾Ê°í Àִµ¥ ÀÎÅÍ³Ý »çÀÌÆ®¿¡¼¸¸ ¶°µµ´Â ¾ê±âÀÎÁö ¸ð¸£°Ú½À´Ï´Ù¸¸, »çÅä Å×¾²Å¸·Î¿Í 1905³â ¾²½Ã¸¶ÇØÀü¿¡¼ µµ°í Á¦µ¶ÀÇ Âü¸ð¿´´ø ¾ÆÅ°¾ß¸¶ »ç³×À¯Å°°¡ 1907~1909³â ÀϺ»Çرº´ëÇп¡ ÀÖÀ» ¶§ ÀÌ ÀÌ·ÐÀ» ¸¸µé¾ú½À´Ï´Ù.
¾Æ·¡´Â ÀϺ»¸»À» ÇÏ´Â µÎ ¹Ì±¹ÀÎ ¿ª»çÇÐÀÚ°¡ (ÇѸíÀº Çرº Ãâ½Å, ´Ù¸¥ ÇѸíÀº Á¤º¸±¹ Ãâ½Å) ¾´ Kaigun - Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941ÀÇ 143ÂÊ ³»¿ëÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
"The 70 percent ratio arose from research undertaken at the Naval Staff College, 1907-1909, by Sato and Akiyama Saneyuki on the force level necessary for the Japanese navy to have a chance against an attacking American or German fleet. Sato started with the widely held assumption of the day that it was necessary for an attacking fleet to hold a 50 percent superiority in firepower over a fleet defending its territorial waters. For that reason, Sato concluded, in order to repel an attacking fleet, a defending fleet had to possess 70 percent of the strength of an attacking fleet; anything less than this percentage - say, 60 percent of an attacking enemy's strength - would imperil the security of the defending nation.
70% ºñÀ²Àº °ø°ÝÇÏ·¯ ¿À´Â ¹Ì±¹ ¶Ç´Â µ¶ÀÏ ÇԴ븦 ÀϺ»ÇرºÀÌ °ÝÅðÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ±â À§ÇØ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ Àü·Â ·¹º§¿¡ ´ëÇؼ »çÅä Å×¾²Å¸·Î¿Í ¾ÆÅ°¾ß¸¶ »ç³×À¯Å°°¡ 1907³âºÎÅÍ 1909³â±îÁö Çرº´ëÇп¡¼ ÇÑ ¿¬±¸¿¡¼ ³ª¿Ô´Ù. »çÅä´Â °ø°ÝÇÏ´Â ÇÔ´ë°¡ ¹æ¾îÇÏ´Â ÇÔ´ë¿¡ ´ëÇØ È·Â¿¡¼ 50%ÀÇ ¿ìÀ§¸¦ °¡Áö´Â °ÍÀÌ ÇʼöÀûÀ̶ó´Â ´ç½Ã ³Î¸® ÆÛÁø ¹ÏÀ½¿¡¼ Ãâ¹ßÇß´Ù. ÀÌ·± ÀÌÀ¯·Î °ø°ÝÇÏ´Â ÇԴ븦 °ÝÅðÇÏ·Á¸é ¹æ¾îÇÏ´Â ÇÔ´ë´Â »ó´ëÀÇ 70% Àü·ÂÀ» °¡Á®¾ß¸¸ ÇÏ°í ±× ÀÌÇÏ´Â - ¿¹¸¦ µé¸é °ø°ÝÇÏ´Â ÇÔ´ë Àü·ÂÀÇ 60% - ¹æ¾îÇÏ´Â ³ª¶óÀÇ ¾Èº¸¸¦ À§ÅÂ·Ó°Ô ÇÑ´Ù°í »çÅä´Â °á·ÐÀ» Áö¾ú´Ù. (¹ø¿ªÀÚ ÀÇ°ß: ¿Ö °ø°ÝÀÚ°¡ ¹æ¾îÀÚº¸´Ù ȷ¿¡¼ 50% ¿ìÀ§¸¦ °¡Á®¾ß ÇÏ´ÂÁö¿¡ ´ëÇؼ Á¦´ë·Î µÈ ±Ù°Å°¡ ¾ø°í, µû¶ó¼ ÀÌ ¼öÄ¡¸¦ °Å²Ù·Î µÚÁýÀº °Í¿¡ ºÒ°úÇÑ ¹æ¾îÀÚ°¡ °ø°ÝÀÚÀÇ 70% Àü·ÂÀ» °¡Á®¾ß ¹æ¾î°¡ ¼º°øÇÑ´Ù´Â ³í¸®µµ ¿ª½Ã ±Ù°Å°¡ ¾ø´Ù.)
Thus born the dogma of the 70 percent ratio, to which the Japanese navy clung for the next thirty years. As the central issue in a domestic campaign waged by the navy for funding to expand the fleet, the 70 percent ratio presented several advantages. It was so simple as to amount to almost a slogan; it sounded reasonable in that Japan sought to build only 70 percent of the strength possessed by the United States; and for some politicians, if not the admirals, it obscured the limits of Japan's own industrial base, which could probably not build a navy larger than 70 percent of the US Navy, in any event. The same insistence on a 70 percent standard was later used for maintaining the fleet overseas during international negotiations on naval arms limitations."
ÀÌ·¸°Ô Çؼ ÀϺ»ÇرºÀÌ ±× ´ÙÀ½ 30³â°£ ±×Åä·Ï ÁýÂøÇÑ "70% ÁÖÀÇ"°¡ ž´Ù. ÇԴ븦 Å°¿ï µ·À» ¹Þ¾Æ³»±â À§ÇØ ÀϺ»ÇرºÀÌ ¹úÀÎ Ä·ÆäÀÎÀÇ ÁÖ¿ä À̽´·Î¼ "70% ÁÖÀÇ"´Â ¸î°¡Áö ÀåÁ¡ÀÌ ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. 70% ÁÖÀÇ´Â ³Ê¹«³ª ´Ü¼øÇؼ °ÅÀÇ ±¸È£Ã³·³ ½á¸ÔÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú°í, ÀϺ»ÀÌ ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ °¡Áø Àü·ÂÀÇ 70%¸¸ °Ç¼³ÇÑ´Ù´Â °ÍÀº ÇÕ¸®ÀûÀ¸·Î µé·È´Ù. ±×¸®°í Çرº Á¦µ¶µéÀº ¸ô¶óµµ ÀϺΠÁ¤Ä¡Àε鿡°Ô 70%¶ó´Â ¼öÄ¡´Â ¾îÂ÷ÇÇ ¹Ì±¹ÇرºÀÇ 70%º¸´Ù ´õ Å« ÇرºÀº °Ç¼³ÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø¾úÀ» ÀϺ»ÀÇ »ê¾÷·ÂÀÇ ÇÑ°èµµ ½½Â½ °¡·ÁÁÖ¾ú´Ù. 70%¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÁýÂøÀº ³ªÁß¿¡ Çرº ±ººñ Á¦ÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±¹Á¦ Çù»ó¿¡¼ ÇԴ븦 ÇØ¿Ü¿¡ À¯ÁöÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ±¸½Ç·Î »ç¿ëµÇ¾ú´Ù.
Âü°í·Î 1Â÷´ëÀü ÀÌÀü µ¶ÀÏÀÇ Æ¼¸£ÇÇÃ÷µµ "¸®½ºÅ© ÀÌ·Ð"À̶õ °ÍÀ» µé°í ³ª¿Í ¿µ±¹Çرº Àü·ÂÀÇ 2/3¿¡ ÇØ´çÇÏ´Â ÇԴ븦 °Ç¼³ÇÏ¸é ¿µ±¹ÀÌ °¨È÷ µ¶ÀÏÀ» Ä¡Áö ¸øÇÒ °ÍÀÌ°í ¿ÀÈ÷·Á µ¶ÀÏ¿¡°Ô °íºÐ°íºÐÇÏ°Ô º¯ÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ÁÖÀåÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·±µ¥ ¿µ±¹ÀÌ ±×·¡µµ µ¶ÀÏÀ» Ä£´Ù¸é ¿µ±¹ÇرºÀº ¿ª»çÀûÀ¸·Î Ç×»ó ÄÚ¾Õ±îÁö ¿Í¼ ÇØ»óºÀ¼â¸¦ ÇÏ´Â "close blockade"¸¦ ÇßÀ¸´Ï±î µ¶ÀÏ ¾Õ¹Ù´Ù·Î µé¾î¿Ã °ÍÀÌ°í, ¿©±â¶ó¸é µ¶ÀÏÇرºÀÇ Àü·ÂÀÌ ¿µ±¹Çرº Àü·ÂÀÇ 2/3Áö¸¸ ¿µ±¹ÇرºÀ» ±úºÎ¼ú ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù°í ÁÖÀåÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
Ƽ¸£ÇÇÃ÷´Â "¿µ±¹Àº ¹Ýµå½Ã close blockade¸¦ ½ÃµµÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù"°í ´ÜÁ¤À» Áþ°í ¿©±â¿¡ ¸ÂÃç ¸ðµç °ÍÀ» ®´Âµ¥ ¸·»ó ÀüÀïÀÌ ÅÍÁöÀÚ ¿µ±¹ÇرºÀº "close blockade"´Â ÇÏÁö ¾Ê°í ¸Ö¸® ºÏÇØÀÇ ÀÔ±¸¿¡¼ Á߸³±¹ ³×´ú¶õµå¿Í µ§¸¶Å©·Î °¡´Â ¹è±îÁö ´Ù Àâ¾Æ °Ë»çÇÏ´Â "distant blockade"¸¦ Çؼ Ƽ¸£ÇÇÃ÷¸¦ ¹Ùº¸·Î ¸¸µé¾ú½À´Ï´Ù.
"»ó´ë¹æÀº ¹Ýµå½Ã ÀÌ·² °ÍÀÌ´Ù"¶õ ¾î¶² ÀüÁ¦¸¦ ±ò°í »ó´ë¹æÀÇ Àü·ÂÀÇ 70% Á¤µµ¿¡ ÇØ´çÇÏ´Â ÇԴ븦 °Ç¼³Çß´Ù°¡ ¸·»ó ÀüÀïÀÌ ³µÀ» ¶§ ±× ÀüÁ¦°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁöÁö ¾Ê¾Æ ¸ÁÇÑ °ÍÀº 1Â÷´ëÀüÀÇ µ¶ÀÏ°ú 2Â÷´ëÀüÀÇ ÀϺ»Çرº¿¡°Ô °øÅëµË´Ï´Ù.
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<br><br>
Admiral <font color="red">Kanji Kato</font>, tactiturn chief of the Naval Staff, found ways more potent than words last week to inform the Nation that he disapproves the London Naval Treaty.
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Asked by the America-Japan Society to attend a farewell dinner for returning acting U. S. Ambassador William R. Castle Jr., the chief of staff refused.
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Although forced to receive a courtesy call from Naval Minister Takeshi Takarabe, who got home from the conference only last week, it was noted that the call lasted the bare five minutes etiquette demanded.
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When the newly arrived minister announced that he would give a dinner to the departing U. S. Ambassador and asked Admiral Kato to attend, he again refused.
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<font color="red">In a most definite gesture, he resigned his post.</font>
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Moreover it has long been known that Admiral Kato's favorite protege on the naval staff of which he is chief was <font color="red">Lieuenant-Commander Yeiji Kusakari</font>, scion of an old Samurai clan of deathless bravery, a highstrung man of 40, husband of a devoted wife, father of four. This officer last week engaged a berth at Kobe on the night express for Tokyo. Along toward dawn the conductor heard groans from his compartment, knocked diffidently, received no answer, debated for some time before he dared to unlock a staff officer's door.
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The berth was a dark sodden pool of blood, upon it in terrible agony writhed Lieutenant-Commander Yeiji Kusakari. He had chosen the most painful and for a Samurai the most noble death: <font color="red">harakiri</font>. With a short dagger which had belonged in medieval times to one of his ancestors he had slashed his abdomen through and through.
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The conductor could do no more than call an ambulance when the train reached Tokyo. Admiral Kato's brave protege died in hospital. Practically the entire Japanese press assumed that his suicide was a protest against the Treaty, though he left behind no explanation.
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As usual Prime Minister Yuko ("Shishi," "The Lion'') Hamaguchi displayed iron nerve, inflexible purpose. It was clear to him, as it certainly is clear to all Occidental experts, that Japan obtains great advantages from the Treaty, although naturally not getting all she asked in every category. <font color="red">Lumping her gains together it appears that while she set out to get <u>70% of the U. S. naval strength</u> in battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, she actually got 71.3%</font>. Therefore the lion-hearted Prime Minister ignored all protests, bloody or otherwise, prepared to push ratification of the Treaty.
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Àú 70% ÀÌ·ÐÀÇ °¡Àå Å« ¹®Á¦´Â ÀÏ´Ü ±âº»Àû ³í¸® ÀüÀç°¡ ºñ °úÇÐÀûÀÌ°í ºñ ³í¸®ÀûÀε¥´Ù °¡»óÀûÀÎ ¹Ì±¹¿¡ ºñÇؼ ÀϺ»ÀÇ ±¹·ÂÀÌ ¾ÐµµÀû ¿¼¼À̹ǷΠ70%ÀÇ Àü·ÂÀ» °®Ãß·Á°í ÇÏ´Ù°¡´Â ÀϺ» °æÁ¦°¡ °ßµô ¼ö ¾ø´Â Áö°æÀ¸·Î °£´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ°ÚÁÒ.<br>
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