미 국방부 장관 직속의 "국방부 운용시험 및 평가 감독국"(DOTE : Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation) 보고서에서 연안전투함(LCS)에 대한 비판이 나왔다는 내용입니다. 요 몇주동안 LCS의 비판이 주로 비용 초과 문제에서 나왔다면, 이번 비판은 승조원들이 부족해 피로로 쓰러질지도 모른다는, 즉 승조원 운영 측면에 대한 비판이라는 것이 다르네요.

DDG 67 USS 콜함이 급유 중에 테러리스트에 의한 자살 폭탄 보트의 공격으로 승조원이 사망한 사례를 들어, 데미지 컨트롤 상황시 필요한 승조원이 부족한 것도 지적한 것 같습니다. 또한 LCS의 생존 가능성 기준도 전투함이라기보다는 지원함 수준에 맞추어져 있다는 것도 지적되었습니다.

또한 현재 개발중인 DDG 1000 줌월트급 구축함(DD(X))도 척당 30억 달러가 초과되는 금액이 문제가 되었고, 승조원 수도 알레이버크급의 300명에 절반수준인 150명 수준인데, 승조원 구성이 줌월트급만의 독특한 연안 지원 임무에 적당한 것인지에 대한 문제도 거론하고 있습니다.

신형 강습상륙함인 LHA 6(LHA(R))에 대한 문제도 언급되었네요. 현재 강습 상륙함과는 달리 항공기 운영에 중점을 두는 대신 "Well Dock"이 부족해 상륙장갑차와 상륙정의 능력이 부족해진 것을 언급하고 있습니다.

미 해병대의 고속 상륙돌격장갑차인 EFV(Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle)도 비판의 대상이 되었습니다. 흔히 알려진 제원대로 17명의 해병을 상륙함으로부터 해안까지 20노트로 수송하려면, 2000 파운드에 달하는 장갑을 제거한 후에 운전자는 핸즈프리로 조향없이 가속해야만 한다고 합니다. -_-;

이런 기술로는 수상에서 크고 예측할 수 없는 턴은 불가능하며, 전투상황시에는 안전하지 못하다고 평가했습니다. 현재 전체 EFV 프로그램은 초기 생산분을 포함하여 연기되고 있다고 합니다. 미 해병대의 EFV의 요구 사항이 너무 높은 것이라는 의견도 있네요.


출처 : NavyTimes

DOTE report criticizes LCS

By Andrew Scutro - Staff writer
Posted : Saturday Feb 3, 2007 9:05:42 EST

Small but highly trained crews may succumb to “excessive fatigue and failure” in combat or a battle damage contingency on the Navy’s much-anticipated Littoral Combat Ship, according to a comprehensive evaluation of the nation’s current and future weapons programs.

Among other ships, aircraft and vehicles, the future LCS concept draws significant concern from the Office of the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation, an arm of the Defense Department.

The DOTE report, published in December, examines everything from developing Navy programs like LCS and CVN-21 to current aircraft, torpedoes and the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.

Not all weapons and systems draw harsh criticism, but not all are fully examined, either.

For example, while NMCI is a common cause of heartburn among sailors and Marines, its DOTE examination “did not address the NMCI performance in totality.”

Evaluators assessed NMCI use with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons. It found that squadron “information systems can operate in the NMCI environment” on deployment but still found deficiencies in “training, deployment procedures, contractor support” and other matters.

But the critical assessment of LCS comes at a low point in the short history of the Navy’s newest ship.

In recent weeks it’s been revealed that program costs have far exceeded earlier claims; construction of the third ship has been halted; program manager Capt. Don Babcock was relieved of duty Jan. 5; and a congressional subcommittee plans to publicly scrutinize the program in a Feb. 8 hearing.

But the Defense Department evaluators are concerned about the lack of sufficient manpower in its minimally manned crew in the event of a damage control situation, such as the October 2000 attack on the destroyer Cole and the mine strike of the frigate Samuel B. Roberts in April 1988.

“Initial conclusions indicate manning levels do not portend success in a stressing mine warfare scenario,” the report reads.

LCS has a total mission and ship’s crew of 75 sailors.

Bob Work studies Navy and Marine programs as a defense analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

While he supports the Navy’s push for a networked fleet, the concepts behind LCS cannot be fully tested until the ship joins the fleet. Like the evaluators, he’s concerned about the small crew.

“Forget damage control — what if five of the crew come down with food poisoning?” he says.

Likewise, evaluators note that LCS is being built to the survivability standard of an auxiliary ship, rather than a combatant ship.

* The Zumwalt-class destroyer, or DDG 1000, formerly known as the DD(X), also comes under criticism in the report.

Still in the development stages but approaching expected construction costs over $3 billion apiece, the concept of DDG 1000 as a minimally manned combat ship comes under scrutiny.

Compared to an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer crew of more than 300, the DDG 1000 will have fewer than 150 sailors aboard, with most maintenance and administrative functions ashore.

For the ship to be successful, the Navy will need to reorganize.

“Current shore support infrastructure and Navy manpower management policies are not fully suited for the unique requirements DDG 1000 will have,” the report says.

* Evaluators also question the new amphibious assault ship, or LHA 6.

Unlike existing big-deck amphibious ships, the new model lacks a well-deck for launching assault vehicles and landing craft to make more room for Marine aircraft and support.

The evaluators want more information.

“No analyses have been provided that explain how LHA 6 will execute traditional and future expeditionary strike group or marine expeditionary unit missions,” the report states.

* The Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle suffers particularly descriptive criticism.

Intended as a high-speed replacement for the amphibious assault vehicle, the EFV showed “poor system reliability availability and maintainability.”

Meant to carry a squad of 17 Marines from amphibious ships to shore at 20 knots, the evaluators found that even after 2,000 pounds of armor was removed from the vehicles, they could not get up to speed in water unless the driver was “hands-free” and accelerated without steering.

“This technique typically led to large, unpredictable turns in the water. This is an unsafe condition for combat,” evaluators wrote.

Now the entire EFV program, including initial production, has been delayed.

Work, a former Marine officer, says the demands on the vehicle may just be too high.

“What the Marines are asking that vehicle to do is quite challenging from a technical sense,” he said.